The Oklahoma Bar Journal January 2026

determination from another state made in accordance with the UCCJEA will be enforceable in the state granting the prior non- UCCJEA-compliant determination. CONCLUSION The term “jurisdiction” under the UCCJEA is a rather slippery term. Since it clearly does not refer to personal jurisdiction, it is unclear what it actually refers to, since the law knows only one other type of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction. In state constitutional law, subject matter jurisdiction flows from the state constitution. While UCCJEA “jurisdiction” is not technically subject matter jurisdiction, it does refer to the trial court’s ability to hear and determine a custody case, what ever it might be called. For lack of a better term, the drafters of the original UCCJA called it jurisdic tion. Both subsequent enactments (the PKPA and the UCCJEA) were stuck with that term. It still refers to the same thing: the ability of a court to hear and determine a child custody determination and the interstate enforcement of such a determination. The UCCJEA is not concerned with the subsidiary issues of subject matter jurisdiction, such as waiver, raising the issue for the first time on appeal, etc. It is, however, concerned with the enforcement of interstate custody determinations that are not made in accordance with its terms. Such determinations are not enforce able. Thus, compliance with the UCCJEA is still mandatory for interstate enforcement of any custody determination. Therefore, even though the UCCJEA might not be able to limit the jurisdiction of state courts, it may indeed limit

which determinations from other states are enforceable. It behooves an attorney to be sure that the cus tody determination does indeed comply with the UCCJEA so that it will be enforced in another state, should one party later relocate. Author’s Note: The views in the article are solely those of the author and should in no way be attributed to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The author would like to acknowledge and thank Monica Dionisio and Carolyn Thompson for all their efforts and hard work in reviewing, editing and improving this article. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and on the Family Law Joint Editorial Board for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. He has written several books on Oklahoma family law, and for many years, he served as a consultant to the OBA Family Law Section. He has received numerous awards from the OBA and the Family Law Section, including a lifetime achievement award. 1. 2025 OK 22, 567 P.3d 374. 2. Issues concerning mootness since the children had already been returned to their mother on the basis of the collateral consequences doctrine and that the UCCJEA jurisdictional issues did not apply to the juvenile case. 3. See 43 O.S., §551-101, cmt. 4. See, e.g., Rader , 2020 OK 106, ¶7, 478 P.3d at 441 (“Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.”); White v. Adoption of Baby Boy D ., 2000 OK 44, ¶38, 10 P.3d 212, 220 (quoting In Interest of L.S ., 1997 OK 109, ¶6, 943 P.2d 621, 622) (the UCCJEA’s predecessor, “[t]he ENDNOTES ABOUT THE AUTHOR Robert G. Spector is an internationally recognized expert in family law. He served as the reporter for the

UCCJA is the exclusive method in Oklahoma to determine subject matter jurisdiction in all custody proceedings.”); Joliff v. Joliff, 1992 OK 38, ¶6, 829 P.2d 34, 36 (“The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) established mandatory prerequisites for determining subject matter jurisdiction in custody cases in Oklahoma.”). Recently, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals declared, “The UCCJEA pertains to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” H.M.A ., 2025 OK CIV APP 2, ¶10, 563 P.3d at 317; see also Jones v. White , 2018 OK CIV APP 68, ¶¶28-34, 430 P.3d 544, 550-551 (finding the parties may not agree, consent, acquiesce or stipulate to subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of an initial child custody determination). 5. The court then applied the UCCJEA to hold that Oklahoma was the child’s home state and that, under the children’s code, the child was deprived. I have no quarrel with the court’s holding on these issues. My concern extends only to the court’s discussion of the jurisdictional underpinning of the UCCJEA. 9. 2018 OK CIV APP 68, 430 P.3d 544. 10. 28 U.S.C. §1738A. This section was enacted to bring full faith and credit enforcement to child custody determinations that had been lacking since child custody determinations were not considered final at common law. The PKPA differed in significant ways from the UCCJA, thus necessitating a revision of that act into the now UCCJEA, which was drafted to fit within the PKPA. Thus, for interstate purposes, complying with the UCCJEA ensures that the PKPA will also be complied with. The UCCJEA has been adopted in 49 of the states and most territories. 11. As the reporter for the UCCJEA, I was loath to insert the comment. However, the drafting committee of the UCCJEA specifically wanted this comment inserted and indeed that is the law in most states that view the issue in the traditional sense of the UCCJEA as an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. Those states, however, have not considered the role of their state constitutions in determining whether the UCCJEA can indeed limit the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts. 12. Hightower v. Myers , 304 S.W. 3d 727 (Mo. 2010). See also In re J.W . 267 Cal. Rptr.3d 347 (2020); Williams v. Williams , 555 N.E.2.2d 142 (Ind. 1990); Interest of D.S ., 602 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. 2020); McCormick v. Robertson , 28 N.E.3d 795 (Ill 2015). 13. Barbara Atwood, “Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality,” 52 Ohio St. L. J. 369. 14. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). 15. 28 N.E.3d 795 (Ill 2015). 16. 750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. 17. McCormick v. Robertson , 15 N.E.3d 968 (Ill Ct. App. 2014). 18. McCormick v. Robertson , 28 N.E.3d 795 (Ill 2015). 19. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. 20. People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff , 795 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 2003). 21. 28 N.E.3d, 795, at 803. 6. 1992 OK 38, 829 P.2d 34. 7. 1992 OK 38, 829 P.2d 34. 8. 1981 OK 39, 626 P.2d 1336.

Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.

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THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL