The Oklahoma Bar Journal January 2026
UCCJEA or the determination was made under factual circum stances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA, and the determination has not been modified in accordance with the UCCJEA. One of the defenses to registration, recognition and enforcement of a custody determi nation in sections 551-305, 551-306 and 551-308 of the UCCJEA is that the order sought to be enforced has been modified or superseded by a decision of a court with juris diction under the UCCJEA. Here, it is absolutely clear. Nevada’s determination is made in accordance with the UCCJEA and is entitled to be enforced. Illinois’ determination was not made in accordance with the UCCJEA, and because of the UCCJEA-compliant Nevada order, it is therefore not enforceable, even in Illinois. The enforcement issue did not come up in the Illinois appellate opinions because it was not put at issue. If the issue had been phrased in terms of whether Illinois had to enforce the Nevada judgment as opposed to whether Illinois had jurisdiction to enter the original order, the case would have come out differently. This issue did not arise in the Oklahoma case of N.A. because the court ultimately determined there had been compliance with the UCCJEA. Thus, the take away for attorneys practicing in states like Illinois and Oklahoma, which follow the position taken on subject matter jurisdiction in McCormick and N.A ., is that the attorney had better be sure that the child custody determination conforms to the UCCJEA and, as a result thereof, the PKPA. Otherwise, it will not be enforced in any other state, and a contrary
The term ‘jurisdiction’ under the UCCJEA is a rather slippery term. Since it clearly does not refer to personal jurisdiction, it is unclear what it actually refers to, since the law knows only one other type of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction.
erroneous. However, that did not mean the trial court was without jurisdiction to make the erroneous determination. The court decided that the jurisdictional language of Section 201 of the UCCJEA “must be understood as simply a proce dural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of the court’s inherent authority.” 21 It con cluded that the appellate court was correct, and the trial court erred in dismissing the case due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Again, it is important to dis tinguish between jurisdiction to decide a case and recognition of judgments. Determining which decisions can be enforced and which cannot is clearly a matter within the competence of the Legislature, unlike state subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the question on remand in the Illinois case is: Which determina tion should be recognized: Illinois or Nevada? Section 303 of the UCCJEA mandates recognition of custody determinations if the court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the
Mr. McCormick appealed, and the intermediate Illinois appel late court reversed. 17 The Illinois Supreme Court granted a peti tion to appeal and affirmed the intermediate appellate court. 18 It found that subject matter juris diction is conferred by the Illinois Constitution, and the Legislature did not have the power to contract it. 19 Subject matter jurisdiction, the court said, “refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” With few exceptions, a circuit court’s subject matter juris diction is conferred by the state’s constitution. Thus, while the Legislature may create new mat ters for the judiciary to decide, its ability to do so does not extend or contract the court’s jurisdiction. 20 The UCCJEA, the Illinois court found, was a different matter. It is a statutory command concerning when a court may decide a certain case. In this case, it is clear that the trial court failed to meet the crite ria of the UCCJEA with respect to initial child custody determina tions. That means the decision was
Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.
14 | JANUARY 2026
THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL
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