The Oklahoma Bar Journal January 2026

relocate to the 182/183-day child support threshold, Bugg unnec essarily risks conflating child support definitions with custody and parenting time concepts. This application could inadvertently grant relocation presumptions to parents who have the time, includ ing just one more overnight in a calendar year, but perhaps not the primary responsibility (doctor vis its, school enrollment, etc.). While Bugg is unpublished and, therefore, not binding precedent, it illustrates the difficulties associated with determining who is a primary parent in hindsight when neither parent has an express designation in the court order. As indicated by statutory silence and case law, there is no requirement that, in the event of divorce or separation, either parent should be designated “primary” for any purpose, unless the parties so agree or the court makes that determination. When designating a parent as “primary” in a child custody order, the term should be defined. If the parents share joint custody and equal time, state what “primary” means. It may be limited to determining the school the child will attend. If the intent is to give a parent final decision- making authority, the order should clearly state that. When joint cus tody and equal time are contem plated, but one parent wants to be the “primary” parent, find out what they mean. Are they contemplating future relocation? If so, it may be more efficient to address that issue head-on during the negotiation pro cess rather than later, in hindsight. For practitioners, the lesson is straightforward but vital: Whenever “primary” status is at issue, do not assume a shared understanding of what the term

the primary parent inquiry is a fact-based, historical analysis focused on the allocation of time rather than a forward-looking best interests analysis at the start of a relocation case. In a partial dis sent, one judge noted that based on the court’s own definition and the undisputed facts, the mother was already the primary physical custodian, and the case should have been remanded to proceed with the relocation hearing. In a recent unpublished opinion, Bugg v. Bugg , 12 an appellate panel answered the “primary” question in part by looking to definitions from the Child Support Guidelines. In Bugg , the Court of Civil Appeals held that in the absence of a specific designation, the parent with more than 182 overnights is automatically the “custodial par ent” with the presumptive right to relocate. Because the mother had the children for 209 days, the court found she was the de jure custodial parent and granted her the pre sumptive right to move. The appellate panel’s reference to 43 O.S. §118A raises an import ant question regarding statutory intent. Section 118A includes the definitions for the child support guidelines, and its definitions are designed to calculate financial obligations. Historically, Oklahoma courts have distinguished between financial support and physical caretaking. As noted above, it is possible for a parent to have more time than the other yet be the child support obligor. 13 In Bugg , the mother had more time with the children than did the father. She could have been determined to be the primary parent as a matter of parenting time without reference to the child support definitions statute. By connecting the right to

means. Clarify whether it refers to school district designation, day-to-day caregiving, relocation considerations or something else entirely. Where possible, define it explicitly in orders and agreements, thereby avoiding ambiguity and preventing future disputes. By treating the term with precision, lawyers can better serve their clients, anticipate potential areas of conflict and ensure that custody arrangements reflect the best interests of the child.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Aaron Bundy of Sapulpa is a trial lawyer who practices across Oklahoma, Arkansas and Missouri. Board-certified for family

law trial work by the National Board of Trial Advocacy, he focuses primarily on contentious jurisdictional matters and complex financial disputes. Mr. Bundy is a fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the International Academy of Family Lawyers.

ENDNOTES

1. Spencer v. Spencer, 567 P.2d 112. 2. Looper v. McManus , 581 P.2d 487

(citing Spencer ).

3. Okla. Stat. tit. 43 §112(C)(2). 4. 2017 OK 27. 5. Id . at ¶6. 6. Boatman , above, at ¶7. 7. 2015 OK 79. 8. 2016 OK 36, ¶15, 369 P.3d 1068. 9. 2010 OK CIV APP 104, ¶13. 10. Okla. Stat. tit. 43 §118E; State v. Coldwater , 2016 OK CIV APP 3. 11. Case No. 118,522. 12. Case No. 122,448. 13. Okla. Stat. tit. 43 §118E; State v. Coldwater , 2016 OK CIV APP 3.

Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.

JANUARY 2026 | 55

THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL